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Deliberative Democracy and the Secret Ballot: Can We Have 
Both? Three Areas of Tension
Rasmus Uhrenfeldt
Aalborg University
Abstract: Recently, Bart Engelen and Thomas Nys have offered an analysis of some of the non-
deliberative properties of the secret ballot. This marks an interesting theoretical approach that 
I will build upon in this paper. I do this by identifying and discussing three areas of tension 
between deliberative ideals and secretive voting. I divide these areas into three separate 
categories – which I label the justificatory tension, the self-regarding tension, and the sincerity 
tension. I argue that both the justificatory tension and the self-regarding tension signify 
substantial areas of tension between the current practice of secretive voting and some of the 
ideals within deliberative democracy. In the last section of the paper, I argue that one way to 
reduce the tension between the practice of secretive voting and deliberative ideals is to adopt 
an epistemic approach to deliberation.
Key words: deliberative democracy, secret ballot, public voting, ethics of voting. 
Thomas Nys and Bart Engelen have recently argued that the practice of secretive 
voting is in tension with some of the values often encouraged within the theory 
of deliberative democracy (2013). For reasons I will describe shortly, this is a very 
interesting approach to adopt when analyzing our current practice of secretive voting. 
The approach that Engelen and Nys take is, self-admittedly, not an attempt to develop an 
extensive comparison between the theory of deliberative democracy and the secret ballot. 
(2013, 495). Instead, they use deliberative principles as their starting point for a critical 
evaluation of voter secrecy. It is my objective in this paper to provide some of what they 
have omitted, namely, an in-depth and more theoretically specific discussion of the relation 
between the secret ballot and deliberative democracy. That is, I try to argue how certain 
specific commitments in the theory of deliberative democracy ought to make us skeptical 
of the process of secretive voting. This approach is interesting for several reasons. First of 
all, it is surprising that one of the universal institutional structures in liberal democracies 
– secretive voting – has not undergone any full-fledged, systematic normative analysis 
from the vantage point of the ideals of deliberative democracy. This is striking, in part, 
due to the individual importance of both deliberative democracy and the secret ballot. 
The secret ballot, as an institutional design, is enshrined in Article 21 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and is at the center of the procedural workings of modern 
democratic systems of voting for citizens. Article 21, (3) states: “The will of the people shall 
be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and 
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret 
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1948) Secondly, in the world of democratic theory, deliberative democracy is a major, 
and central, theoretical apparatus which commands the attention of several influential 
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scholars. (Elster, 2003; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Cohen, 1997; Bohman, 
2000.) If there is real tension between a major theoretical framework, such as deliberative 
democracy, and the widespread form of secretive voting, then this seems worth exploring 
– if nothing else, so as to lay bare the reasons why such a tension is currently to be accepted 
as a political reality.1
From here on, my approach is the following. First, I will shortly describe some of 
the core normative features of deliberative democracy. I then identify and discuss three 
areas of tension between deliberative democracy and the secret ballot. The first tension 
concerns voter justification, the second self-regarding voting, and the third sincerity in 
voting. After arguing that these three aspects are in tension with the practice of secretive 
voting, I proceed to discuss various objections to the existence of these tensions. I conclude 
that these objections fail for various reasons, but that one way to relieve the tension is to 
adopt an epistemic approach to deliberative democracy.
I. W H AT IS DELIBER ATI V E DEMOCR ACY? 
Deliberative democracy is a vast theoretical enterprise designating a multitude 
of normative positions and principles (Elster 2003; Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 
2004; Cohen 1997; Bohman 2000). On a fundamental level, it is a theoretical view that 
emphasizes the importance of justifying public policy with reasons acceptable to all who 
are bound by those policies. Justifying the exercise of political power is to be done on the 
basis of reasoning among free and equal citizens (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 52, 
Cohen 1997, 412).
One way to identify some of the values of the deliberative model is to contrast it with 
an aggregative model. On one influential understanding of these two models, voting is the 
mere aggregation of fixed preferences, while deliberation seeks to base political decisions 
on the collective and preference-altering nature of public deliberation (Elster 2003). That is, 
deliberation attends to the formation and justification of preferences, while aggregation 
compiles individual political preferences, typically through a voting process. 
In this paper, what I want to draw attention to is not the general relationship 
between voting and deliberation, but the secretive aspect of voting and its relationship with 
deliberation. Secrecy is a distinct feature of voting that adds to the normative worries 
highlighted by deliberative theorists. It is those worries to which I will soon turn. However, 
in order to gain some conceptual precision for the analysis to come, I will first describe 
two different conceptions of the value of deliberative democracy as this will become 
important in the latter part of this paper. The first concerns political legitimacy, and the 
second concerns epistemic benefits.2 For my purposes, this distinction between the 
1]  This is obviously not a tension felt by all, since not everybody ascribes to the principles of 
deliberative democracy.
2] This distinction does not imply that these two conceptions can always be kept separate. For 
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legitimacy approach and the epistemic approach to deliberative democracy is important. 
It is important because I will argue that the tension between the ideals of deliberative 
democracy and the secret ballot does not concern not a tension between an epistemic 
approach to deliberation and voter secrecy.
Legitimacy:
Joshua Cohen locates part of the central value of deliberation in the relation between 
the legitimacy of political outcomes and the deliberative activities of those who are bound 
by such outcomes. He writes: “In particular, outcomes are democratically legitimate if and 
only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals. The ideal 
deliberative procedure is a procedure that captures this principle.” (Cohen 1997, 73). The 
free exchange of reasons, in which citizens partake, aims to establish the legitimacy of the 
outcome of the democratic process. These outcomes are to result from the free exchange 
of ideas, arguments, and justifications about what constitutes the common good of a 
given society. Since political decisions are binding on all, the legitimacy of the outcomes 
should, therefore, consist of the deliberation of all (Manin 1987, 352). Another value 
that the deliberative approach emphasizes is the respect citizens are shown when they are 
afforded a fair hearing in the deliberative process both preceding and following policy-
formation. By letting people have their say in a deliberative interchange, their standing to 
make claims or offer reasons is acknowledged, and they are therefore being respected in a 
morally substantial way (Chambers 2017, 268). 
Epistemic Approach:
Some also locate the value of deliberation in the epistemic benefits it can provide. For 
example, if participants, through the giving of arguments and the weighing of evidence, 
produce more accurate beliefs, then this is an epistemic benefit of the deliberative 
interchange (Peter 2016, 142). On one view, the deliberative model can be seen as a 
truth-tracking procedure, which functions properly when it provides increasingly reliable 
information about the proper or morally right outcomes of democratic processes. Such a 
view entails, roughly, that there are right and wrong answers to some political questions, 
and public deliberation is one reliable way in which we can come to some approximation 
of these answers (Landemore 2017, 284). Deliberation might accomplish this on the basis 
of enlarging the pools of ideas and information, weeding out bad arguments and leading 
to consensus on the most reasonable outcome (Landemore 2012, 97). This, however, 
does not imply that consensus is thought of as a requirement in order for there to be an 
epistemic benefit to deliberative procedures. It might be that even if disagreement persists, 
the deliberative process sheds light on the reasons for the disagreement and therefore 
knowledge as to why the disagreement has yet to be solved. 
example, one can hold that political decisions are only legitimate insofar as they are, to a certain degree, 
epistemically justified.
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II. DELIBER ATION A N D (SECR ETI V E) VOTING
The relationship between the principles of deliberation and the existence of 
majoritarian decision-procedures (i.e., voting) is a complicated one. It is, however, not 
difficult to see why deliberative democrats may regard secretive voting as problematic. 
This may stem from a more fundamental uneasiness between deliberation and voting 
in general. Jeremy Waldron sums up quite nicely what such uneasiness can consist of: 
“Voting shifts us from the qualitative consideration of substance to sheer quantitative 
business of seeing which proposition enjoys the support of the greatest number.” 
(Waldron 1999, 212). 
If what we value is the substance of the public arguments and viewpoints that are put 
forward in the democratic dialogue, then voting may be seen as a rather crude form of 
decision-making. It collectivizes our individual preferences, giving no special attention 
to what these preferences are, how they are formed, and whether they’re justified. The 
crudeness of this aggregation of preferences consists, at least in part, in treating each 
and every input the same. The fact that voting is also secret only seems to add to this 
crudeness. Not only are individual preferences undifferentiated, but they are also tallied 
up anonymously – meaning that it is difficult to hold citizens accountable for their act of 
political influence, and to call upon them to justify themselves. If we are convinced that 
the exercise of power should be justified to the citizenry, that wielders of power should 
be accountable, and that choosing our leaders should be based on publicly debated 
reasons, then it is not initially difficult to see why we might be worried about with the 
non-deliberative and non-justificatory structure of voting secrecy.3
III. CL A R IF Y ING THE A RGU M ENT
As mentioned, I will structure the following discussion by building on some 
recent arguments and observations made by Bart Engelen and Thomas Nys (2013). 
To put their argument into context, it is important to note that they are not proposing 
that a commitment to deliberative principles implicates – in any form – the abolition 
of the secret ballot. Nys and Engelen discuss many substantial potential problems that 
accompany certain forms of public voting. For example, an open system will yield strong 
social pressure on those who are socially and economically least well off. This will lead 
to voter abstention, which will threaten the inclusive ideal of democratic participation 
(Engelen and Nys 2013, 501–2). Other worries include the possibility of citizens yielding 
to social conformity, or the possibility of an increase in political polarization, in which 
citizens become more staunch and unflinching in their political convictions (Engelen 
and Nys 2013, 501). I agree that these are considerable problems, which would need to 
3] Some praise the inclusive and egalitarian aspects of voting. (Mansbridge et al 2010, 85). This form 
of equal inclusivity – Mansbridge and others point out – “[...] makes a statement of equal respect parallel to, 
but qualitatively different from, the respect accorded by listening in deliberation.” (Mansbridge et al 2010, 85)
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be acknowledged if one is to make an argument for the practical implementation of some 
form of public voting. However, this paper is an analysis of how some of the ideals and 
principles of the deliberative model are in tension with the current and widespread form 
of secretive voting. In other words, the normative principles within deliberative theory 
should lead us to be very skeptical of the use of secretive voting.4 The fact that public 
voting may currently be infeasible does not defeat the purpose of such inquiry. One way 
of seeking out potential problems with our current institutions is by seeing how they fall 
short of normative ideals.5 Also, there are multiple circumstances relating to the process 
of voting, which might, potentially, be made more deliberative. Understanding how the 
current process of secretive voting holds up to the ideals of deliberative democracy is 
useful in exploring such circumstances. 
I V. THR EE A R E A S OF TENSION
4.1. The Justificatory Tension
So, in what sense are the principles of deliberative democracy in tension with the 
secret ballot? First, Engelen and Nys stress that one of the central normative commitments 
of deliberative theory concerns the justification of our public policies to those who are 
bound by them. They state, for example, that: “[...] it is not sheer numbers, but the views 
and arguments of citizens that should matter in a democracy. Democratic politics is about 
justifying the exercise of power by means of reasons that all citizens can reasonably be 
expected to endorse.” (Engelen and Nys 2013, 495). As Engelen and Nys point out, under 
a secretive system, voters experience little in terms of an incentive to justify or explain 
themselves. One of the problematic aspects of voter-secrecy, then, is that it helps to shield 
each voter from potential deliberative pressure of giving some explanation or justification 
for how they vote (Engelen and Nys 2013, 497). With no verifiable way to hold people to 
account for how they vote, they can cast their ballot however they like, for any reason they 
like. Now, this is obviously also possible in a non-secretive system, in which people can 
still vote for whatever reason they feel like. What seems to make up the central difference 
for Engelen and Nys is that secrecy denies us the possibility of actually knowing how people 
vote. If people actually were to know, they could hold others accountable for their choices 
in the voting booth. 
It is important to distinguish two ways in which this will increase the deliberative 
circumstances of voting. First, citizens can now engage each-other after elections, and 
they can demand a justification – they will be able to say: “You voted for x, explain 
4] There is a slight terminological clarification to be made here: when it is suggested that some 
principles are in tension with some practice, it does not mean that those principles are therefore themselves 
endorsed. It means, instead, that if one endorses those principles, then these areas of tension arise. 
5] Engelen and Nys also use it to show how demanding deliberative principles are for citizens. 
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yourself!” Such an interchange could, presumably, continue even after the election is 
over. Second, this will also create an increase in the internal deliberative workings of 
the voters before the election, since they now can reasonably expect to be asked to justify 
themselves. They will thus be faced with an incentive to think – from the perspectives of 
others – about how they will explain themselves, which will mark an increase in internal 
deliberation.6 What I want to do now is to explicate how this tension relates directly 
to some of the core commitments of deliberative theory, and to draw some important 
distinctions based on this. 
In order to do this, consider the following description of the notion of reciprocity 
from Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson: “Reciprocity holds that citizens owe one 
another justifications for the mutually binding laws and public policies they collectively 
enact.” (2004, 98). Importantly, they add that very few traditions give the notion of 
reciprocity the same central role as it is afforded in deliberative democracy. (Gutmann 
and Thompson 2004, 98). Now, as they are formulated here, reciprocity and secrecy are 
not at odds with each other. It is certainly possible for citizens to offer justifications and 
reasons in a deliberative interchange, and then – assuming that deliberation does not 
yield agreement – use a majoritarian and (secretive) decision-mechanism. In this sense, 
secrecy and reciprocal justification are certainly not conceptually incompatible. Instead, 
the deliberative worry about voter secrecy is that voting is part of the process in which we 
choose not only political representatives but also public policy.
It is, therefore, proper to make the circumstances of the voting process more 
deliberative. On this view then, deliberation and voting co-exist: voting is an inherently 
non-deliberative way of (temporarily) ending the preceding deliberative interchange. 
What the position entails, instead, is a commitment to making the circumstances and 
the process of voting more deliberative by creating a greater incentive for deliberative 
interchanges and accountability on behalf of voters. By making the voting process 
more open, we are approximating the deliberative ideal that citizens should stand in a 
justificatory, reciprocal relationship with each other. Again, we can distinguish two 
dimensions of this claim. First, openness is conducive to an increase in both internal 
and external deliberative pressure, which can increase the public deliberative pressure 
on voters before and after elections. Second, openness makes voters accountable to each 
other, such that they must offer justifications for their acts of political influence. It is 
also important to note here that the value of voter justification can also be understood 
in several different ways. Justification may be valuable because it is instrumental in 
creating a valuable form of a political community. This form of a political community is 
one in which citizens show respect for each other when each seeks to justify the political 
influence they exert through voting. Secondly, voter justification may be epistemically 
valuable because it is conducive to creating better input for political decisions. On this 
second view, the value of an increase in justificatory deliberation consists in getting 
6] On the notion of internal deliberation, see Goodin 2000. 
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citizens to vote on the basis of the substantial arguments that ‘survive’ the justificatory 
process. The justificatory process is the process of internal reflection that voters undergo, 
and the justificatory exchanges they partake in with each other, before and after 
elections. The value of this deliberative increase consists of creating the best epistemic 
circumstances for citizens to cast their vote. I will explore this distinction in the last 
section of the paper. 
Let me summarize this first area of tension: if what is normatively important is the 
substance of the reasons and justifications we give each other, then a system that makes 
it possible for citizens to offer no justifications at all, let alone reasons that all citizens 
can reasonably be expected to endorse, leaves much to be desired.7 Again, it is certainly 
possible to value both the process of justification and also value secrecy. The tension 
that Engelen and Nys pinpoint, as I see it, is that secrecy de-incentivizes and reduces 
deliberative aspects of the voting process. Comparably, then, public voting is more 
conducive to at least some of the ideals of deliberative democracy. This tension can be 
labeled the justificatory-tension with secrecy.
4.1.1 Objections to the justificatory tension
 One way to mount a general counter to the justificatory tension is to argue that 
there is a second-order deliberative justification for the non-deliberative circumstances of 
voting. (Mansbridge et al. 2010, 88) For example, if the procedure of voting has undergone 
proper public justification, then the process retains deliberative legitimacy – even if the 
individual votes can be cast without giving a justification. Similarly, it can be argued that 
secretive voting retains deliberative legitimacy because the process of secretive voting 
has undergone the proper public deliberative justification, even if the individual votes 
have not.8 However, I do not believe that this response gets at the essential issue. First, 
the potential deliberative worry about secrecy is that the votes themselves are not exposed 
too much justificatory pressure. This worry seems to persist even if the procedure has 
undergone proper public justification. A slightly different proceduralist response to the 
justificatory tension is to suggest that as long as the proper deliberation has taken place, 
the outcomes are legitimate (Christiano 1996, 35). Again, I do not think this response 
poses a solution to the justificatory tension with secrecy.9 This is because the justificatory 
tension does not assert that outcomes are to be deemed illegitimate because they have 
been chosen in secret. Rather, the point is that the secretive procedure limits important 
parts of the deliberative scheme: that of justification for, and accountability of, political 
actions that are collectively binding. 
7] The non-deliberative structure of secret voting is also noticed by Frederick Schauer (1999, 20). 
8] Whether or not this process has been publicly decided upon is an empirical question that I, at 
present, cannot attend to. 
9] Nor is it directly intended to in this context. It is merely used as a possible objection. 
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Lastly, even if we do accept the procedural response, it only shows that we can 
make the procedures more deliberately justified, but it is not clear why we should not 
also make the votes themselves more deliberately justified.10
Moving away from procedural responses, we can question the justificatory tension 
with secrecy on more fundamental grounds. For example, Russel Hardin has argued 
that it is only public officials who should be expected to give reasons for their decisions 
and not citizens. It is inherent in the political role of public officials that the public can 
demand justifications, while citizens do not have such public obligations. (Hardin 
1999, 221-2) If deliberative democracy concerns only the relationship between public 
officials and citizens, then claiming that citizens should justify themselves [and their 
votes] is surely an unwarranted extension of the principles of deliberation. However, 
Hardin’s description of the obligations of deliberative democracy seems too restrictive. 
Indeed, as he himself notes, most normative theories of democracy place obligations 
of justification and accountability on behalf of public officials – surely, deliberative 
democracy must entail more than just this (Hardin 1999, 221).11 On a very influential 
account, the task of justification is quite explicitly given to both officials and citizens 
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 52). Hardin is, of course, right in noticing that different 
obligations and demands of justification apply differently to citizens and public officials. 
However, citizens are most certainly to be included within the deliberative scheme, as 
it is their preferences, arguments, and proposals that the deliberative interchange seeks 
to establish and promote. 
Therefore, these objections are not successful in countering the tension between 
secrecy and deliberation. 
4.2. The Self-Regarding Tension
I will now turn to the second area of tension: the all-affecting nature of voting. 
How we act as a collective, especially in voting, is something that will impact the whole 
of society. We ought, therefore, to take into consideration the common good, instead 
of merely attending to our own personal preferences. This public-mindedness, also a 
virtue in deliberative democracy, is, according to Nys and Engelen – difficult to square 
with a secretive voting system. This is due to how secrecy makes voting a private act, 
while voting in public induces voters to attend to more public reasons for their vote 
(Engelen and Nys 2013, 496).
This privatization of motivation in voting runs counter to the public ideal of 
deliberation, in which citizens are to acknowledge and engage with other political 
actors to discover, or establish, what is of common interest to them. With an open vote, 
10]  This argument is similar to the argument Jonathan Quong  (2004) makes concerning the 
wide view of public reason.
11] Hardin leaves himself some room to ascribe obligations to citizens by saying ‘primarily’. Also, it is 
possible that deliberative democracy does entail more than this, but not more in terms of obligating citizens. 
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on the other hand, people can face inquiries, questions or demands for justification for 
how they vote. Since citizens can verifiably know how people vote under such a system, 
there will be a stronger incentive for voters to offer reasons that others can understand 
or acknowledge since purely self-regarding political preferences will be harder to defend 
publicly (Nys and Engelen 2013, 496).12 Due to this form of public deliberation, voters 
must think in terms of what other citizens are likely to appreciate or acknowledge. This 
pressures voters into adopting different viewpoints, enlarging the sense of what matters 
for the public good or society at large (Benhabib 1996, 72).
By making the voting process more deliberative in this way, there will be an increase 
in pressure to offer reasons in public, but also to offer reasons the content of which are 
public, in the sense of being acknowledged or understood by others. Obviously, there 
are empirical complexities that arise here. What if voters just conform to the prevailing 
social norms of their community? What if they cloak their essentially private interests 
as being ‘in the name of the common good’? These are important questions, but as of 
now, what is of interest is the claim that some of the principles of deliberative democracy 
are more aligned with that of giving other-regarding or common-good reasons. This 
can be labeled the self-regarding tension with voter secrecy.
4.2.1. Objections to the self-regarding tension
One principled response, then, is to question the role of these self-regarding 
reasons in deliberative democracy. Jane Mansbridge has, for example, argued that self-
interest has a legitimate place in democratic deliberation because it serves two important 
functions. By clarifying and exploring our private interests, we are identifying the 
different preferences that must be attended to when publicly deliberating on the common 
good – it thus helps to give us information about the particular interest that ‘go into’ the 
deliberative process. Second and more controversially, is the claim that self-interests are 
themselves justifications, and thus serve as reasons for implementing certain policies 
(Mansbridge et al. 2010, 73–74). Such an argument does not take us very far. The reason 
for this is that even if self-interest can play a legitimate deliberative role, they may continue 
to do so under public voting. So, even if we grant that self-interested reasons can serve as 
justifications, very little follows from this. The deliberative argument here must be that 
public voting is more conducive to the giving of public reasons – and this does not suggest 
that self-interested reasons can, or should, play no role in deliberative interchange.
There are, however, empirical reasons to be skeptical of the self-regarding tension. 
There is empirical data suggesting that citizens actually do not vote in self-regarding, or 
purely self-interested ways (Chong 2013, Funk 2000). Voting in secret, then, does not 
seem to purge us of altruistic or other-regarding concerns. This, however, only shows 
voters vote altruistically even when they do not vote publicly. This does not suggest that 
12]  See Brennan and Pettit 1990 for a similar argument. 
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public voting will not yield an increase in the public content of reasons and an increase in 
the amount of public discussion of voters.
4.3. The Sincerity Tension 
One last area of tension I want to highlight concerns sincerity. Engelen and Nys 
suggest that the secret ballot can be seen as a corrupting influence on democratic citizens, 
as there is something deceitful about keeping voting shrouded in secrecy ( 2013, 496). 
Although they do not explicate or develop this point much further, I believe that more 
can be said for it. I think we can elaborate on it by summarizing it as a concern about 
sincerity (Gardner 2010, 936). Under a secretive system, there is no way of knowing 
whether citizens actually ‘follow-through’ on their convictions, ideas or expressed 
standpoints. Secrecy, then, allows for voters to take a public stance, and then to vote for 
something completely different (Gardner 2011, 931-32). This, Gardner suggests, has 
implications for some normative conceptions of deliberation: 
“Deliberative theories tend strongly to disfavor insincerity because it is a form of 
strategic behavior that is thought to undermine true deliberative engagement and 
thus to impair the ability of deliberators to reach a genuine consensus.” (2011, 936) 
A similar concern has been expressed by Rawls, namely that “[...] public discourse 
runs the risks of being hypocritical: citizens talk before one another one way and vote 
another.” ( 2005, 215). 
How does insincerity pose a possible problem if we want to satisfy the conditions 
of deliberation? Prima facie, it is not difficult to initially see why sincerity is a deliberative 
virtue. If we want to have policies and legislative changes publicly justified to us, and have 
the arguments of citizens publically heard and acknowledged, then we need to know 
about the truthful opinions and real circumstances of the lives of citizens in order for 
the deliberative enterprise to establish or clarify the policies that should pertain to these 
citizens. Being insincere can be a way of treating the democratic forum as an opportunity 
to advance one’s interests on the basis of power or strategic manipulation, which runs 
counter to the normative ideal of trying to connect public policy to the outcomes of the 
honest argumentative back-and-forth of citizens. How, then, does insincerity pertain 
specifically to the question of secret voting? The worry, as stated above, is that secrecy 
allows for us to vote not on behalf of the preceding deliberative engagements, but for 
any reason – indeed, reasons that may run counter to our deliberative agreements or 
clarifications. Now, what does it mean to say that people can vote in a way that is not 
a continuation of the preceding deliberative interchange? I take it to mean that if we 
agree – through the use of public deliberation – that candidate A will best serve our 
interest, then the secrecy of the ballot allows for me to go vote for candidate B instead, 
thus not ‘carrying out’ the action that we agreed to be the best option. I have therefore 
been insincere in my public expressions of my support of candidate A, and this form of 
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insincerity is made possible because of the secrecy of the ballot.13 This can be labeled as 
the sincerity-tension with voter secrecy.
4.3.1. Objections to the sincerity tension
I do not think that sincerity presents as substantial a tension as either the 
justificatory or the self-regarding tension. I will here present some reasons why I believe 
this to be the case. 
First of all, it is not clear that it is voter secrecy that matters all that much in this 
instance. To better see this, contrast it with a public system. In a public system, you can, 
rightfully perhaps, impugn me for voting differently then what we publicly established 
to be the proper candidate. But, this does not show me to be insincere in the pre-voting 
process of the election. I may have come to realize that a different candidate is actually 
a better fit for the arguments and concerns we both deliberated on. Also, publicity in 
voting cannot – by itself – reveal what my reasons are for voting a certain way. They can 
only hide or publish how I vote. Open voting can only reveal that at least some of my reasons 
have changed, if my pre-election reasons included my desire to vote for A, and I ended up 
voting for B instead.  
Lastly, there is a question concerning the size of the group doing the deliberation. 
Following Gardner, what is worrisome about insincerity is the strategic element of it 
(Gardner 2011, 931-32). This seems like a legitimate worry in smaller-scale settings. To 
better see this, imagine a small group of people facing a decision on how to allocate some 
limited amount of resources. They start off by trying to allocate these resources by public 
deliberation, by a fair and respectful weighting of the concerns of the members of the 
group. After engaging in this process, they find out that they will not be able to distribute 
the resources merely on behalf of public argument, so the process ends with a vote. 
Imagine this vote to be secret. If the deliberative process has yielded some preliminary 
agreements, such as a decision on how to allocate at least some of the resources, then 
if someone votes contrary to this agreement, she is not acting on behalf of their public 
considerations of how to achieve the optimal outcome. She may be more interested in 
voting in ways that serve her strategic goals, rather than to vote on behalf of their public 
agreements. This seems to hurt the deliberative process in this scenario, because the 
deliberative process is not, in the right way, causing, or influencing, the outcome that was 
publically decided on.14 
Some problems arise when this strategic worry is applied to decisions in mass-
democracies. First, if one’s vote has limited causal power – such as in general elections 
in large democracies – then there are weaker reasons for one to vote strategically due 
to the diminishing returns of the vote. Second, it is not clear as to what constitutes 
13]  Assuming, of course, that I knew I wouldn’t vote for this candidate at the time of voicing 
my public support. 
14]  In this situation they only vote because of practical necessity. 
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the deliberative engagements that one must vote on behalf of in mass democracies. Is 
it troublesome to have citizens vote in a way that deviates from what was agreed on, 
or publicly argued for, in previous engagements with friends, family members or co-
workers? I doubt that we have very strong intuitions in the affirmative here. Also, such 
engagements seem too far from removed from any concrete political change to be 
properly deemed democratic deliberation. Therefore, there seems to be an ambiguity as to 
how we are to understand what it means to vote on ‘previous deliberative engagements’ 
in mass democratic societies. This does not show that strategic voting cannot be a 
legitimate worry as it relates to secrecy; it only shows that such a worry relates to the 
electoral scale that is under discussion, from general elections in mass democracies 
to decisions undertaken in smaller electoral contexts. For these reasons, the sincerity 
tension might apply to a small-scale deliberative setting, while it seems less significant in 
mass-scale democratic settings. Hence, the sincerity tension, as presently stated, presents 
less tension than the justificatory and self-regarding aspects. 
Let me take stock. So far, by attending to some of the comments by Engelen and 
Nys, I have identified three aspects of secretive voting which are in tension with some 
of the theoretical virtues of deliberative democracy. For the remainder of this paper, 
I suggest that an epistemic approach to deliberative democracy is one efficient way to 
relieve some of this tension. 
V. W H Y (SOM E) DELIBER ATI V E DEMOCR ATS M AY NOT FAVOR PUBLICIT Y 
At this point, I want to argue the three aspects of secretive voting under discussion 
are not in tension with some of the epistemic aspects of deliberative democracy. Simone 
Chambers has some very helpful distinctions relevant for this discussion. She points out 
that we may have reasons that are by their nature un-shareable, yet not selfish or purely 
self-regarding. These include, for example, comprehensive world-views that others, due 
to different metaphysical commitments, cannot accept (Chambers 2004). Likewise, she 
points out that the distinction between private and public reasons does not necessarily 
track any epistemic qualities. We can have well-reasoned, reflective forms of self-
regarding justifications and have poorly-reasoned or shallow forms of other-regarding 
justifications (Chambers 2004). Opening up deliberation to a wider public may yield 
an increase in the public reasons offered under some circumstances, but this does not 
mean that these public reasons are epistemically sound or well-thought-out positions. 
Chambers puts her point like this: 
“The problems associated with going public are not problems of private reasons but 
rather the problem of shallow public reason: wanting to please the largest number of 
people possible or wanting to appear firm and decisive in the public’s eye. Thus the 
appeal is general but the content is suspect.” (2004, 394). 
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By opening up a deliberative process to the general public, an incentive can be 
created to meet the discursive demands by giving shallow or superficial reasons, which 
threatens to flatten the discursive landscape. Chambers calls this plebiscitary reason, 
and it consists of the following well-known strategies: manipulation, pandering, image-
maintaining (2004, 398). Engelen and Nys are also aware of these potential epistemic 
pitfalls. They argue, for example, that public voting can lead to voters refusing to adjust 
or change their positions, due to not wanting to appear weak (Engelen and Nys 2013, 
500). With this in mind, consider the two strongest tensions once again. The first is 
the justificatory tension, which is the tension between the normative deliberative 
requirement of giving reasons and a secretive voting process in which reason-giving is 
de-incentivized. One reason why deliberative democrats ought, in principle, to favor 
publicity is that the process of justification yields an internal and external increase in 
voter deliberation. Ideally, such a process promotes voting based on the arguments 
and reasons that emerge, and are promoted, in the public political arena, which is to be 
preferred to a system in which voters can choose to vote for whatever reason they like, 
for no reasons, or for bad reasons. Following Chambers, however, there may be worries 
about the possible epistemic effects of this. For example, citizens may pander by offering 
reasons their social surroundings find acceptable, or citizens may vote a certain way 
to maintain or regain a public image. If we’re epistemic deliberative democrats, these 
circumstances are important. They are important because if the justificatory process 
is to yield epistemic benefits, then the process of voter justification must be exercised 
in the right way. Therefore, it is not sufficient that public voting induces both pre and 
post-electoral public deliberation by voters, because that deliberation may lack the 
prerequisite epistemic qualities. 
Consider, now, the self-regarding tension. The principled deliberative worry about 
secrecy in this respect is that secrecy runs counter to understanding political decisions 
as a public, collective enterprise. Public voting is more in line with the goal of offering 
public reasons that others can acknowledge. Again, following Chambers, there are 
epistemic worries present here. For example, it might be that the deliberative interchange 
between voters is not conducive to advancing the best arguments. Perhaps voters will 
give any justification that grants them social acceptance. This does not necessarily mean 
that public voting cannot be conducive to reaping epistemic benefits. It merely suggests 
that if we value democratic deliberation because it is conducive to reaching epistemically 
justified outcomes, then there are additional epistemic circumstances that need to be 
spelled out in order to show that deliberative democracy is principally opposed to secrecy. 
Expressed differently, epistemic deliberative democrats are only principally opposed to 
voter secrecy insofar as secrecy yields an epistemic deficit – and it is not obvious that this 
is the case.15 We need a richer description of the epistemic benefits of publicity to be able 
to argue that there is a principled discrepancy at work here. 
15]  That is: epistem ic del iberat ive democrats a re on ly opposed to secrec y qua being  epis-
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Some might find this claim puzzling. A skeptic might ask: If we are not in favor 
of increasing the deliberative circumstances of voting, because publicity may increase 
the risk of certain epistemic pitfalls, then is any deliberative claim being advanced 
at all? If the skeptic is right in claiming that no deliberative claim is made at all, then 
that is a problem for my argument. It is a problem because it would mean that I would 
be proposing to solve a tension between deliberative democracy and secret ballot by 
simply abandoning some central ideals in deliberative democracy – which is hardly 
a very satisfying solution.16 However, I do not think the skeptic is right about this. I 
agree that it does seem puzzling to suggest that deliberative democrats may have 
reasons not to make some circumstances more deliberative, but such a position is 
possible from within a deliberative viewpoint. It seems puzzling only if we assume 
that deliberative theorists are committed to making everything more deliberative, rather 
than judging everything by deliberative standards (Gutmann and Thompson 1999). If 
the assumption that deliberative theorists are committed to making everything more 
deliberative is dropped, the position I have sketched appears much less problematic. 
Another skeptical reply to my argument is to say that there is an epistemic uptake 
by virtue of there being an increase in justifications given, even if they are epistemically 
unsound, and as such, public voting is more conducive to the ideals of the epistemic 
approach to deliberation than secrecy. I partly agree with this reply. However, the 
strength of this reply would rest on the epistemic substance and the circumstances in 
which those justifications are given. It is not obvious that the increase in the giving of 
justifications equals an increase in epistemically qualified voter deliberation. Such a 
case would require additional argumentative support. 
Therefore, in order to properly analyze the process of secretive voting from the 
vantage-point of deliberative principles, it is important to distinguish between valuing 
justification and the giving of public reasons for epistemic or non-epistemic reasons. 
What I have suggested is that if we take an epistemic approach to deliberation, both the 
justificatory and the self-regarding tension lose substantial steam.17 
As mentioned, however, this is only true for the epistemic approach. The tension 
still exists, at least as I have argued, if we accept that justification and accountability 
are deliberative values which are not exhausted by their potential to yield epistemic 
benefits. For example, if we believe that justification and accountability have intrinsic 
value, then the mere fact that voters become accountable to each other, regardless of 
epistemic benefits, may have value within deliberative democracy. This area of tension 
tem ic del iberat ive democrats . 
16]  It is not unsatisfying because we necessarily should be adamant in upholding deliberative 
ideals. Rather, it is theoretically unsatisfying because my aim is to discuss the tension that exists when 
one wants to uphold values of deliberative democracy and the current practice of secretive voting. 
Simply abandoning either is not in any sense an interesting solution. 
17]  My argument does not warrant the conclusion that the tension is not there, but rather than 
there are insufficient reasons to believe that it is there. 
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between justification and secrecy is not dissolved by accepting the epistemic approach. 
The argument sketched here as to why epistemic deliberative democrats may not, 
principally, be opposed to secrecy, can vary in strength. A stronger version of this 
claim would be an argument showing that secrecy may, in fact, be epistemically superior 
to publicity in the context of voting. I have not defended this stronger version. I have 
instead raised some issues concerning some important distinctions between different 
versions of deliberative democracy and tried to show that there is insufficient ground 
for claiming there to be a principled discrepancy between secrecy and an epistemic 
version of deliberative democracy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I have discussed several parts of the relationship between deliberative democracy 
and the secret ballot. Voter secrecy has a multifaceted relationship with deliberative 
democracy. On the one hand, majority voting as an institutional design gives each 
political input the same weight. Each citizen that partakes in this process has an equal 
say. The secrecy of the ballot adds to this egalitarian inclusiveness by shielding voters 
from external social pressure. Each citizen partakes in the electoral process with no 
direct claim of justification or reason-giving required for this action, signaling that 
each adult can take part in the process, regardless of their reasons for doing so.18 
These inclusive aspects of secrecy also contain the non-justificatory elements – which 
I’ve suggested – are opposed to the ideals of deliberative democracy. Analyzing the 
relationship between secrecy and deliberation seems to bring out these different aspects 
– which I have outlined in three different ways – as the justificatory tension, the self-
regarding-tension, and the sincerity-tension. I’ve suggested that both the justificatory 
and the self-regarding tension are significant tensions, while the sincerity-tension 
remains, at present, unpersuasive as substantially worrisome from the viewpoint of 
deliberative democracy. Lastly, I’ve argued that there are insufficient reasons to suggest 
that epistemic deliberative democracy is in tension with voter secrecy. Needless to 
say, such conclusions are merely preliminary, I hope, however, that they provide some 
conceptual tools for further analysis and discussion.
ru@learning.aau.dk
18]  A nnabelle Lever has argued that this egalitarian aspect of the secret ballot signals the in-
herent democratic value of voter privacy. (2015) 
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